Introduction
Human security has attracted a wide range of audiences, both academic and practical, for more than a decade, as a product of post Cold War atmosphere of the world. Its creation and spread have always been in tandem with the reconsideration of security notion itself, not only what it means, but also who provides it for the sake of whom. In addition, for the study of International Relations (IR), reviewing security has been closely related to extensive re-examination of state sovereignty. Although the term was originally born in policymaking field, its meaning is now intimately being tied with academic inquiry as well.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between the discourse of human security and the role of academic-policy complex in Japanese context. The whole argument is based on a presumption that the country has played quite unique role for developing human security concept. This does not mean that Japan has been one and only actor that accomplished the task. Yet, Japan had particular conditions and strength all of which worked to the country's contribution for developing a discourse of human security, and especially under the powerful initiatives of the ''academic-policy complex''. Here, the discourse of human security has been created as ''Japanese Social Science''.
The word ''Japanese social science'' is an analogy of Stanley Hoffmann's famous argument of International Relations as ''American social science'' (Hoffmann, 1977 (Hoffmann, /2000 . In this article, he lists several conditions that enabled the disciplinary development. It is arguable that human security is not an independent academic subject. In addition, Japanese attempt has been certainly a limited one, in a sense that has been an act of assembling relevant elements rather than creating the idea itself. It therefore seems an exaggeration, and even a mistake, to say human security is a Japanese discipline. Nevertheless, the whole project has remained a serious intellectual activity for the country's IR and International Law (IL) scholars, as well as Tokyo bureaucrats, in order to launch an academically attractive and practically useful concept related to post Cold War Japanese policy. The underlying motivation for those people has been a sort of aspiration that post Cold War Japan would and should have been as important and honourable actor in international society. Human security as ''Japanese social science'' thus means that it is an endeavour of Japanese academic-policy complex, and this paper attempts to explore how it has been preceded.
The next section briefly reviews the general idea of human security and Japanese engagement toward it, while the section three characterizes the country's efforts as an ''assembly line'' with three constitutive elements. Section four will further explore Japanese peculiarity by listing four factors that are especially striking, and then by making an analysis on the intimacy between human security and academic-policy complex. In conclusion the author will put summaries and additional questions.
The Background: A Short Review of Human Security

The Starting Point
The coinage of the term ''human security'' might be a surprising event, since this is a concept named by non-military, non-state organization of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 1994 ). Yet its very origin dates back to the Sun Francisco conference of 1945, mentioning that achieving freedom from fear and from want would lead to enduring peace of the world (UNDP, 1994: 3) Until the early 1990s, issues of poverty, food distribution, infectious diseases and environmental degradation had not been regarded seriously as security concerns. They had simply been treated as the matters of, literally, development and environment. Despite some notable exceptions, which may best be epitomized by Barry Buzan's work on international security studies (Buzan, 1991) , these issues had been subjected because of its non-military and non-state-centric character. However, it is exactly these tenets which has become of growing importance. Still not dismissing the value of sovereign states, human security aims to go beyond traditional coverage of security. The essence of insecurity is identified not only in the phenomenon of inter-state war, but also in various socio-economic situations.
Conceptually speaking, what has been new with human security is that the idea integrates the meaning of security, of freedom, and of human, into one framework. Its central pillars, namely the freedom from fear and from want, are very closer to Isaiah Berlin's notion of ''Two Concepts of Freedom'' (Berlin, 1969) . Also, regarding the subject of security, the shift from states to human collectivity enables to focus on human dignity as one of core principles to accomplish. The emergence of human security can thus be rephrased as ''emancipation'' (Booth, 1991) .
Japanese Engagement
Japan's action for promoting human security is traced back to 1998.
1 Comparing the UNDP's first proposition in 1994, the country's reaction was relatively slow and limited: its first presentation was linked in the context of Asian financial crisis. Yet this initial attitude was soon changed, and a comprehensive view as a Japanese policy was presented at the Kyushu-Okinawa Summit in 2000. The same year, the country's government announced the establishment of the Commission on Human Security (CHS), under the co-chairmanship by Ms. Sadako Ogata of the former UN High Commissioner for Refugees (now Japan International Cooperation Agency), and Professor Amartya Sen of the Trinity College, Cambridge (now Harvard). There is also an interesting story that then Prime Minister (PM) Yoshiro Mori, the successor of Keizo Obuchi, expressed his support for human security during his visit among African states, the first trip by the Japanese PM to Africa.
There are mainly two activities that Japanese government made special efforts, namely the establishment of the UN Trust Fund and of the CHS. Regarding the former, Japan has consistently raised its contribution up to some 207 million USD The money has been distributed to 130 projects (as of December 2008) aiming for the ''protection'' and the ''empowerment'' of people in need. The CHS was created as a response from former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Its primary objective was to ''develop the concept of human security and make recommendations that would serve as guidelines for concrete actions to be taken by international community'' (MOFA 2006) . The completed report was submitted to then PM Jun-ichiro Koizumi in February 2003, as well as to the Secretary-General Annan in May, the same year. In addition, along with the recommendation in the Report, Tokyo government and the UN jointly created a separated unit for human security in the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Apart from these international activities, Japan re-organized her policy of the Official Development Assistance (ODA). By revising its charter, Japan incorporated the idea of human security as one of basic principles of the ODA, as Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects (GGPs). What a brief review in previous section tells us is, despite Japan's active engagement, a fact that the idea of human security is not a sole product of Japan, but the one of the UN, firstly as a part of post WWII world vision, then as a sophisticated conception for human development. Acknowledging these facts, however, it is still maintained that Japan has played as an ''assembler'' of a human security discourse.
Regarding Japan as an ''assembly line'' means that the country became a locus where relevant elements of human security had been collected, put together, and integrated as one complex of thought, or a discourse. And this is a different phenomenon comparing from that of the UN, and in particular the UNDP, which merely created the idea of human security. Here the point is that creating the idea is a necessary task for pursuing human security, but not sufficient, and one thus needs to have a wider discourse in order for to make the idea operational. The UNDP's attempts involve a major shift of central focus on security from state and military centric to non-state and more comprehensive. It is at this point that revolutionalised the concept of security itself, but it also effectively dismissed some essential facts like that the world is still constituted by sovereign states and that all humans are separately governed by them. Though the UNDP proposal contains universal conception of security, it seems quite difficult to realize the idea in fact without considering how to make it consistent with inter-state politics. In a sense, making the idea of human security operational seems to be a sort of political compromise, by bringing statist elements back in. Nevertheless, this compromise should be understood as an attempt to keep a striking balance between traditional and revolutionary aspects of security and sovereignty. Here, what would be required is an act of assembling relevant elements, or creating one discourse, rather just developing an idea. Such discourse may have other components which constitute human security as a whole, and which help to actualize the pure idea of human security. Thus, the next questions to ask should be how such assembly is preceded and what constitutes the discourse.
Setting the World for Human Security
The first stage of the assembly is to collect ideas about the world in which a discourse of human security can be established and articulated. What is important here is that human security is not based on single worldview, but on two different perspectives: the international society and the universal community of humankind. Each world appears as inter-state relations and globalization. In addition, two worldviews require different types of political arrangement. While the former emphasizes the collaboration among politically competent states and effective management of the world, the second rather pays more attentions to non-state actors and civil societies, seeking an alternative form of polity. In short, the international society requires multilateral international politics, while the universal community calls for global governance.
Corresponding these worldviews to international politics and to global governance is nothing special, and it is not quite fruitful to prioritize one view over another, as the actual world is experiencing both. A necessary inquiry here is not how these two are divided, but how they are connected or overlapped. This question is important because the substantial component of human security discourse is also firmly based on a peculiarly combined view about the world. Indeed, human security is a term with dual meanings: security that has primarily been for the world of states, and human that goes beyond it. As long as the substantial body of human security reflects such combined worldview, the notion itself should also entail mixed accounts of epistemology about the world.
The combined picture of the world can be made by following four steps. First, one acknowledges globalization and various problems accompanied with it. Second, since these global problems often require solutions which go well beyond interactions among states, they compels us to seek good alternatives to deal with. International organizations, particularly the UN, are frequently recalled there. Thirdly, on the other hand, it is simultaneously reaffirmed that the UN is primarily an organization of sovereign states. Finally, however, the enduring importance of international politics through the UN does not exclude the Organization as global agent for problem solving, as Ernst Haas once argued (Haas, 1990) , and instead reaches at a point that the UN is an effective forum to pursue international politics and global governance. Obviously, this is a typical logic of neoliberal institutionalists, but what deserves attention is that this flow of logic connects two types of political arrangements which once seemed as contradictory, multilateralism and global governance. Furthermore, as John G. Ruggie shows (Ruggie 1993 and , the whole logic was inherited to constructivists. It is exactly this neoliberal institutionalist -constructivist line of argument that Japanese policymakers and academics have been following. In the context of human security, it is Toshiya Hoshino (2002) who made this line of argument. Based on preceding papers such as the work of a senior diplomat Takahiro Shinyo (1995) as well as the concept of ''international policy''.
2 Hoshino attempts to understand human security as a part of Japan's international policy, by inserting constructivist framework. However, his view is primarily as an alternative to Realist thinking, and in this point he does not exclude the importance of neoliberal institutionalist thinking.
Establishing Substantial Principles
What comes next is the main body of human security discourse, its principles and forms. Here, there seems to be almost nothing new which Japan has created, so it suffices to mention them briefly.
3 In human security, there are four norms which occupy its core principles: freedom (from fear and from want, alternatively, human capability, as Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen call); human rights; human dignity; and critical security.
Perhaps the biggest difference between human security and traditional sense of security is the former emphasis of freedom as its very core. It does include survival, which has usually regarded as the essence, but Berlin's argument of liberty tells us the idea of freedom has much wider extent than survival. Moreover, putting freedom on its centre re-interprets human being not only as mere object of protection, but also as a positive actor of possible actions. Sen and Nussbaum's argument of human capability suits in this context quite well (Sen and Nussbaum 1993; Nussbaum and Glover 1995; Nussbaum 2000) .
Human security is also unique as it has direct relevancy with human rights and human dignity. The CHS report argues that human security is a complimentary concept for human rights. Putting the respect of human rights as its core, ''human security helps identifying the rights at stake in a particular situation'' (CHS, 2003: 10) . In addition, another term of ''dignity'' has recently added to emphasize the overall importance of human security, by endorsing itself on the notion of broad moral foundation (UN, 2005) .
When thinking about human security, human rights and human dignity, it is unavoidable to ask what the adjective ''human'' means at all. Broadly speaking, there may be two ways to tie people as human collectivity. One is, following Aristotle, to identify the essence of human being in its ability to use practical reasoning, which stresses the full functioning of psyche in ethical judgment. Here, Nussbaum's study of human capabilities is a good example (Nussbaum, 1995a (Nussbaum, , 2000 (Nussbaum, and 2006 . It has certainly been giving positive impacts both for theoretical and practical inquiries, as her colleague of Sen originally coined the term and inserted it into actual public policy of human development. However, the problem with her ''Aristotelian essentialism'' (Nussbaum, 1988 (Nussbaum, , 1992 (Nussbaum, and 1995b ) is that such criterion is apparently based on a Greco-Roman style of human, and this may exclude those who seems to be insufficient to use logos, or those who may use different types of reasoning differently, as non-human, such as the indigenous people in 15 th century South America. Accordingly, what would be required instead is the notion of human, which has been mentioned by Andrew Linklater (Linklater, 2001 (Linklater, , 2002a (Linklater, , 2002b (Linklater, , 2006 Linklater and Suganami, 2006) and Catherine Lu (Lu 2000) . Linklater propounds the idea of ''harm'' in world politics, and he relies on much wider idea of human being that emphasizes not person's intellectual ability but his/her mortality and physical and mental vulnerability, which seem to be seen virtually in all individuals. Lu makes similar argument, by invoking Judith Shklar's idea of ''cruelty'', that cruelty is a point which difficult ethical ideas can be united for condemning and therefore creates new vista of cosmopolitan morality (Lu, 2000; Shklar, 1984) ''.
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Finally, characters mentioned above are, after all, telling a fact that human security belongs to a critical camp of Security Studies. It has already mentioned that some scholars, including Buzan and Ole Waever, have tried to expand and extend the coverage of security. Yet their attempt is not much adequate as they presuppose states as the subject of security in world politics. However, as Mary Kaldor's work typically shows (Kaldor, 1999) , such statecentricity of security is now facing a limit: global spread of violence and the breakdown of some states as ''failed'' suspects whether sovereign states still remains one and only suitable subjects for security. On the contrary, shifting from states to human in human security discourse reflects one trend of post state-centric view, which may be best argued in the Welsh School security thinkers (Booth, 1991; Wyn Jones, 1999) . Indeed, the Welsh Schools' academic slogan ''security as emancipation'' well fits in the context of human security, as the latter emphasizes the dignity, freedom, and rights of human beings.
Seeking Technical Measures for Actualization
The final stage of constructing human security discourse is to equip with measures to actualize the concept. It is this element that differentiates one from UNDP's proposition. Here, what Japan had utilized are threefold, namely international independent commissions (IICs), knowledge, and policy guidelines.
Establishing IICs is now becoming a popular practice in international norm making (Thakur et al., 2005) . Major predecessors include the Brandt Commission for North-South relationship, the Palme Commission for common security and disarmament, the Brundtland Commissions for environment and development, and the International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) for just intervention. Each body is free from external influence and their members usually participate as a private person rather than state officials. Their recruitment is from every part of the world, often considering the balance of regions and gender. The boards are the mixture of policymakers, academics, representatives of civil societies, and even of businesses. Meetings are often open to outsiders, which sometimes accompany the ''out-reaches''. These are central tenets of the IICs, which frequently help to ensure its comprehensiveness, transparency, and legitimacy. In Japan's instance, the CHS meets most of the characters mentioned here.
In addition, the efficiency and legitimacy of the IICs are further ensured by knowledge. As next section presents, in the case of human security, five subjects has respectably provided different but overlapped knowledge basis on which 200 IKEDA the Commission work out. Generally speaking, the outcomes from the IICs are reports. They clarify situations and problems they are tackling, provide intellectual frameworks and explore the issues, examine possible policy measures, and finally present the best alternatives as recommendations. Using knowledge to help to present policy prescription has become a popular phenomenon as Peter Haas' argument of the ''epistemic communities'' presents (Haas, 1992) , and there can be some important similarity to the case of the IICs. But one difference also exists between these two on the extent of knowledge: while the former often uses more strict scientific findings, the latter relies on much wider expertise than natural science. This includes philosophical thoughts (such as the just war traditions) and numerous feedbacks from policy-fields. Moreover, another important difference is that such broaden knowledge often contributes to the social construction of the world and/or the problems themselves, presenting a different types of logical connections apart from natural causation (Kratochwil, 1989) . As presented, most of reports presented by the IICs end with specific policy recommendations. Yet such recommendations in fact work more than mere advice. First of all, together with knowledge that helps to socially construct the issue, they become practical prescriptions for constructed problems. And second, they sometimes take a form of either policy guidelines, code of conducts, guiding principles, or simply to say, the ''soft laws''. The gradual inclination for soft laws can be observed, both in IR, International Law, and Policy Science in general.
5 The case of human security is not an exception as well. The whole argument was published as a report, with specific policy recommendation. While stressing the existing international treaties, human security and the CHS report remains as policy documents and guidelines.
Having mentioned these components, then, Japan's attempt to utilize them in the context of human security seems to be the first experience of its kind. It can be maintained as first not because none of these were ever used, but because the country combined these three simultaneously. In particular, introducing IICs for developing the human security discourse was strikingly important.
The components presented in this section were not the product of Japan. They are made in ''overseas'', and the country simply tied them together. However, in the case of human security, such assembly was what the world has not experienced before. For Japan, developing the human security discourse to establish principles of the freedom from fear and that from want was not just a simple extension of the UNDP's concept, but also a project to make it consistent with international politics. This task requires connecting global governance based on the notion of world as a universal community, and multilateralism under the society of sovereign states. And to make it possible, the country has introduced some technical measures, which hosting the IICs is the most influential. Now, two freedoms expressed in the UNDP report 1994 converted into some policy principles, such as principles of the ''protection'' and the ''empowerment'', active participation of civil societies, and the primary responsibility of each member states (CHS, 2003) . These are the products constituting the essence of human security discourse.
Four Factors for Japanese Particularity
In previous section, we have seen Japan playing as a role of an ''assembly line'' for creating the human security discourse, where three components, mixed view of the world, substantial principles of human security, and technical measures for actualization, had been collected and got together. Yet this analysis does not tell how this experience connects to ''Japanese social science'', or in other words, Japan's peculiarity of human security. Indeed, a similar case can be found in Canada, where government launched an ICC (i.e. the ICISS), and collected relevant components to develop a framework of just intervention. The topics are different, but these two cases seem to suffice to suspect that the assembly and the articulation of certain policy principles are especially characteristic to the ''middle powers''. Nonetheless, Japan has purported more than a middle power in the context of human security, and this can be argued by pointing out four contributing factors: psychological, institutional, intellectual, and material or financial.
They are significant in a sense all have helped to the development of human security discourse. Some overlapping between the components and the factors can be identified. However, while the former are constitutional parts of human security discourse which Japan had collected and assembled with intension, all of the latter are not. The factors on which this section focuses had been developed in different times and occasions, and thus the influence for human security was merely contingently. Despite such randomness, these four factors had been intertwined tightly and co-operated efficiently. In short, the human security discourse was a product of both Japanese diplomatic strategy and lucky contingency.
Factor One: Psychological
The first factor is psychological. This involves the change of attitude among the Japanese people towards international relations, namely from the Post WWII pacifism and UN-centrism to post Cold War attitude for taking international responsibility or ''Kokusai Kouken (international contribution)''.
Originally, the post war pacifism was the product both of the Japan's defeat of the Pacific War and subsequent radical democratization. The mentality was crystallized as the famous Article 9 of the Constitution, which ''renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes (9-1)''. Simultaneously, ''land, sea, [. . .] air forces, as well as other war potential, [would] never be maintained '' and ''[t] he right of belligerency [. . . would] not be recognized (9-2)''. Though the principle of Japanese pacifism had faced major challenges, which eventually allowed government to equip the country with ''the Self Defence Forces (SDFs)'', the principle itself has enjoyed wide national and international support.
The UN-centrism has also long occupied another vital part of post-war Japanese mentality. Such tendency has clearly been intertwined to the country's pacifism. On the one hand, there had been an expectation to the UN through which only the country's security would be ensured, which was a reason why Japan could finally declare to abandon all necessary military means. On the other hand, the post war spirit had created the ''idealized UN'' which could be a closer to the World Government. The idealization of the UN can be seen, for instance, in a Japanese word which means the UN, ''Kokusai-Rengou''. It is literally translated as ''the International Union'', and when comparing a Chinese that simply means ''the United Nations'', there seems to be a significant gap between these two words. It is not only because of two different languages, but also of the difference of country's interpretations towards this Organization.
In addition, for the WWII's defeater, the rejoining to international arena, which had been symbolized by signing a peace treaty and participating the UN, had been the top priority. The articles 53 and 107 of the Charter had remained ''valid'' for Japan, and qualifying the condition to become a UN member, a ''peace-loving state'', had been the primary task. UN-centrism has been the state's one of the three major pillars for pursuing foreign policy, and in 1958, two years later the country's participation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs re-organized and created the Department of the UN (later again re-organized as the Department of Comprehensive Foreign Policy Planning) (Shinyo, 1995: 265-6) . In any case, the UN-centrism has constituted a unique part of Japanese mentality for years.
The turning point was the Gulf War. The diplomatic ''failure'' during that period was the one of existing check book diplomacy, and the series of events triggered huge debate how Japan should behave in the post Cold War international environment. As later mentioned in 1991 and 1992 was the years when Japan firstly enacted domestic laws that allows to dispatch its SDF troops. For the Japanese with the peace Constitution, the change of the tide in earlier 1990s was quite upsetting event because it seemed at odds to the Article 9. Thus in the earlier stage the central question on the country's ''international cooperation'' was whether Japan's expected activity could get along with the Constitutional principles. Here, it is quite natural that a number of people, mostly the left-sided, opposed the government's direction to loosen the constraint. Here, one point to note is that the overall trend of the debate had been shifted from ''whether-or-not'' discussion to ''how'' discussion. After government's interpretation that dispatching military personnel under certain condition would not constitute the action against the Article 9, the whole direction of the debate more focused on the necessary conditions for sending troops. Though incomplete, its result appeared as a domestic law.
Factor Two: Institutional
The second factor is institutional, which includes two different types of institutions: legal and academic.
Legal Institutions: the International Peace Cooperation Law
A series of political events related to the enactment of domestic legislations from 1990 to 1992 clearly shows how Japan was confused to deal with the situations in the Persian Gulf. At the time of 1990, there were almost no legal institutions for dealing with international crises, and the country's poor performance in international society inevitably compelled policymakers and academics to reformulate Japanese direction in the post Cold War era. In a sense, the performance was not actually ''poor'', as Japan's huge financial contribution mounted up to some 11.4 billion USD (Shinyo, 1995: 216) . But country's establishments had already noticed that what Japan had been required was more than giving a blank cheque, and that speedy legislation had seemed to be the first step to go beyond conventional method of foreign policy. Nevertheless, the government's hasty proposition of the ''UN Peace Cooperation Law'' was faced fierce criticisms, and the Liberal Democratic Party and other like-minded groups had to abandon it, which then required more than one and half year to pass an alternative convention in June 1992 as the ''International Peace Cooperation Law (IPCL)''.
The IPCL remains a valid framework for Japan's activities in overseas. There are two kinds of expected situations which allow to dispatch relevant personnel: peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assistance. Both are required to be under the mandate of the UN or UN-related agencies (Article 3-1, 3-2). Three additional conditions -peace agreements between conflict parties, different agreements for accepting Japan's presence, and neutrality principle -are also provided as the prerequisite for dispatch. Moreover, another five principles called ''Go-Gensoku (the five principles)'' are given to clarify conditions under which situations Japanese personnel can act or cannot.
Here, four points can be observed. First of all, the IPCL is the first-ever legal institution since 1945 which allows to send any Japanese officials, in particular the SDF troops, in order to maintain peace. Second, however, this opportunity is considerably restrained by a number of conditions and principles. In fact, the government had initially ''frozen'' particular activities that expect participating staffs to use armed forces if necessary, until the year 2001. Third, therefore, when one evaluates the IPCL from the point of international standards, this legislation seems very ineffective. Such deficiency explicitly reflects Japan's dilemma and subsequent compromise between the Constitutional principles and the will to contribute international peace and security. Finally, however, from the view of Japan's human 202 IKEDA security, the enactment of the IPCL has considerable significance, not only because it enables the country to send troops in conflict areas, but also because it opens up the door for searching Japan's proper direction for taking international responsibility. Tying together with the next two factors, the rise of academic institutions and intellectual development, the IPCL has provided a foundation on which human security discourse become possible.
Academic Institutions: the Increase of Graduate/Policy Schools
Major innovations in the graduate schools was also significant for Japan's development of human security discourse, since these institutions have become powerful sites for accumulating and organizing relevant knowledge, circulating it with academic clarification and qualification, and situating itself as the meeting place for both intellectuals and policy experts. In a general context, the 1990s was the time when the country's postgraduate education was substantially reformed under the banner of ''Daigakuin Jyutenka (the concentration of postgraduate education)''. It eventually led to the increase of the graduate/policy schools.
Overall, Japanese graduate/policy schools can be divided into three types or ''generations'' (See Figure 1) . The first is in the middle and late 1970s. This is the period when the National Institute Research Advancement (NIRA) was established as the first sort of comprehensive policy think-tanks (in 1974), as well as when the first Policy School was hosted in the University of Saitama (in 1977), later re-organized as an independent organization of the GRaduate Institute of Policy Science (GRIPS), Tokyo. In addition, this is also the time when statespeople became much eager than before to sophisticate their ways of policymaking, epitomized by the introduction of 12 policy taskforces in then PM Masayoshi Ohira Cabinet (1978 -1980 .
The second generation can be identified in the first half of 1990s. This is the time when the government's reform plan for ''Daigakuin Jyutenka'' begun to be implemented in national and private universities, which triggered the increase of graduate policy schools. Newly launched departments are in: Nagoya (1991-2), Kobe (1992) , Tokyo (School of Medicine, 1992) , Hiroshima (1994), and Osaka (1994) as national universities, and in Keio (1990 ), Chuo (1993 , Ritsumeikan (1994) , Doshisha (1995) , and Kwansei-Gakuin (1995) as private. What is noteworthy here is while above private institutions established the Department of Policy Sciences or Studies, with the aim to introduce new academic subjects, national universities had much practical aims to provide professional training for ''international development'' or ''international cooperation''.
Finally, the third generation of graduate/policy schools came just after year 2000. This time, two striking points can be observed. First of all, the department established at that time started to award different graduate qualifications which previous generations had not, such as Master of Public Affairs (MPAs), or of Public Management (MPN). In a sense, this type can be the closest to the US style of academic institutions. Secondly, there emerged graduate programs especially for human security. The most notable example is in the University of Tokyo, which now offers two-year terminal course of human security with the qualification of the Master in International Cooperation. Tohoku University also provides a different program jointly tailored by Graduate Schools of Agricultural Science, of Environmental Studies, of International Cultural Studies and of Medicine. Again these two are national universities. As later mentioned, these institutions have played a significant role, often with Tokyo policymakers. Yet at the same time, such introduction as the ''hardware'' of academic-policy collaboration has accompanied another result, intellectual development. 
Factor Three: Intellectual
For a long time, Japan has enjoyed a status of primary consumer of Western intellectual expertise. For creating human security discourse, the same story can be applied. Here, especially four different subjects had provided a broad academic backbone not only for theorizing human security, but also for seeking the way of its actualization. These had been collected, assembled, as shown in previous section, and then constituted as the foundation of human security discourse.
First, the introduction of Policy Science/Studies was of considerable importance. In Japan, there had existed a subject called ''Public Policy'', but it had been chiefly the extension of Welfare Economics. The change started in 1994, when Tadao Miyakawa 6 published two texts of Policy Science (Miyakawa, 1994; based on Harold Lasswell and Yehezkel Dror, which soon became essential readings. Introducing Lasswell's works in particular had two important implications. One, it was the introduction of positivist and even behaviourist methodology. Two, it also created a route for international lawyers to rely on a policy-oriented view. Lasswell is a leading figure not only in Political Science, but also in International Law, as a colleague of Myres S. Mcdougal, the father of the New Haven School (Lasswell and Mcdougal, 1992) .
Secondly, enhancing the concept of security helped to the circulation of human security. Regarding this point, the publication of Kaoru Kurusu's article (Kurusu 1998 ) deserves attention, which was one of the earliest of its kind in Japanese Security Studies.
7 The reconsideration of security was not a recent intellectual phenomenon. One of Ohira Cabinet's taskforces once had explored its meaning and reformulated it as ''Sogo Anzen Hoshou (comprehensive security)''. This idea was quite close to Buzan's argument, by extending and expanding its meaning to cover the widest possible extent (Buzan, 1991) .
Thirdly, the rise of social constructivism in IR theory created a path to theorize human security. As well known, constructivism has been one of the most powerful account in IR for recent two decades. Its theoretical crux can be summarised as: (i) the world is ''socially constructed'' rather merely exists; (ii) actors are playing crucial role for constructing the world but simultaneously being constituted by the world itself; and (iii) in such mutual construction process, it is non-material factors, such as rules, norms and culture and not as power, which play more influencing role. Having said so, the introduction of constructivism was somewhat different in Japanese context. 8 The theory was not recognized as an alternative of Neorealism and the World System Theory, as Alexander Wendt originally purported (Wendt, 1987) , nor as the bridging project between Rationalism and Reflectivism, which Steve Smith once presented (Smith and Owens, 2005) . Rather, it was regarded as a connecting attempt to neoliberal institutionalism, which led to emerge the ''neoliberal-constructivist synthesis'' or the ''institutionalist constructivism''. This synthesis not only propounds neoliberal's view stressing the role of international institutions, but also accepts constructivist's argument that the world is constructed by actors and vice versa. Another point to note is that introducing social constructivism enabled to collaborate IR and IL scholars. What has been occurring in Japan is inter-disciplinal research between these two, 9 a duplicated phenomenon once seen in the States.
10
Finally, the subject called ''international cooperation'' emerged. During the Cold War period, for Japanese, international cooperation had had limited meanings, either bilateral ODA or the ''Seinen Kaigai Kyouryoku-Tai (Japanese version of the Peace Corps)''. However, as traditional methods of aid policy had begun to be questioned, the exploration of desirable international aid became a serious academic inquiry, together with practical interests. Again the bitter experience of the Gulf War was a turning point. Until recently, two different types of the subject had been identified. One was about ''Kokusai Heiwa Kyouryoku (International Peace Cooperation)'', which is mainly developed by governmental side, 11 while another was about ''Kokusai Kyouryoku (International Cooperation)'', which has more general scope and been approached by non-governmental sectors.
12 Yet current trend shows a convergence under the banner of the former name, with the governmental and non-governmental partnerships. After all, what we have seen in this section is Japan's journey to identify a good diplomatic alternative to existing check book diplomacy. All three factors have been given and used to prepare a foundation on which human security discourse has been made. In this situation, material factor, especially financial, seems to become less significant than the former three, but this is not the case. Indeed, using plenty economic resources has remained a primary strategy for Japan's foreign policy. The country still enjoys the status of top donor of the ODA. And the country has been the second largest contributor to the UN. The issue of human security is not the exception. Besides its amount of over 200 million USD, Japan connected the ODA, the UN and human security, by revising the ODA Charter and reforming the existing scheme as the ''Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Project (GGPs)''. There exists a similar aid policy in the United States, called the Millennium Challenge Account (United States Department of State, 2003) . Yet the MCA is a self-standing policy, with some distance from both the UN and human security, which contrast to the GGPs closely connected to the UNTFHS.
Moreover, another form of financial resources began to link with the development of human security discourse apart from the ODA: national subsidiary for graduate schools, both research and teaching, for the purpose of international excellence of academic activities. 4.5 ''Japanising'' Human Security and the Academic-Policy Complex
These four factors were all made in different times and occasions. Thus it means there had been a little initial nexus with each other. Nevertheless, those factors respectively contributed to create a discourse of human security, and Japan's academic-policy complex played a significant role there. Having stated, the question here is in what sense the country's academic-policy complex has been important for making human security discourse.
The first is its style. In general, making a collaborative partnership between intellectuals and policymakers has been a familiar phenomena. Its style can be classified, either as ''national-centred'' or ''multiple participation''. The former is often represented by national/semi-national institutions as a hub for the collaboration, while the latter is characterised by multiple engagement of different actors, such as think-tanks, universities and foundations. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (China), The Chatham House (the United Kingdom), the Japan Institute of International Affairs (Japan), and the Institute of State and Law of The Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia) may belong to the former category, and the situation in the United States may be the latter. The frequent inter-flow of people between academic and administrative sectors makes the collaboration further dynamic in US as well.
In the instance of human security, what has been occurred is the formation of ''multiple-participation'' style of academic-policy collaboration. Various joint research projects have been launched, and they led to a number of publication co-authored by intellectuals and policy experts (Shinyo, 1995; Shimomura et al., 2001; Inada et al., 2004; Shinoda and Uesugi, 2005; Oshiba et al. 2006) . Universities has begun to introduce specialised courses for practical training related to ''public policy'', ''international cooperation'' and ''international development'', accepting students with a wide range of background. In turn, governments and NGOs have become the places for students' internships, where various exchanges emerged. These activities have been financially supported by powerful subsidiaries both from government and foundations.
When looking back again Hoffmann's argument on ''American social science'', however, one may ask whether Japanese example is mere duplication of US experience. Hoffmann points out three factors which contributed to the American uniqueness of IR, namely ''intellectual predisposition, political circumstances, and institutional opportunities (Hoffmann, 1977 (Hoffmann, /2000 '', and the same story can be applied to Japanese case. ''Intellectual predispositions'' were provided by introducing positivist methodologies and problem-solving approach, while ''political circumstances'' were actually given from the US directly, as new Constitution, post-war democratization, and even security umbrella under the Japan-US alliance. Effective institutional arrangement between academics and policymakers had long been undeveloped, yet again the introduction of American Policy Sciences made it possible to create a new route. Above all, there are all phenomena originally happened in the States.
Yet there exists one thing that differentiates two countries in an important sense. That is, while the case in the United States can be characterized as relatively equal collaboration among different sectors, that in Japan has been primarily under the initiative of national government and policymakers. In the US, as Hoffmann argues, ''what scholars offered, the policymakers wanted'' (Hoffmann, 1977 (Hoffmann, /2000 . Things actually happened in Japan was, unlike the States, almost the reverse: what the policymakers wanted, the scholars offered. These two seems quite similar. But while ''new intellectual enterprise'' has always been in tandem with constructing the general foundations of the new diplomacy (Hoffmann, 1977 (Hoffmann, /2000 in the US, Japanese experience has been a copied intimacy with little fresh academic contributions: supportive arguments for human security was proposed from those who once were in policyfields, both bureaucratic and local, and different worldviews were gathered to make human security a discourse. This links to the paper's previous argument that Japan had been a mere ''assembler'' of various elements: as the country's industry, the country is a well-skilled manufacturer, but the activity depends on rich ''resources (=elements)'' in overseas.
4.6 ''Japanising'' Human Security and the Will to ''Unique and Great'' Power Furthermore, one may even counter for the observation made above. That is, a similar case can be made not in the context of the United States, but that of Canada. Canada did have the experience as Japan: two states are like coworkers to enrich human security, by clarifying the conditions for just intervention (ICISS, 2001 ). The ICISS itself was the product of the strong leadership of Canadian then PM Jean Chrétien and Foreign Minister of Lloyd Axworthy, and the Commission had received generous support from national government. What can be observed in Canadian case is a powerful initiative of policymakers, which involves a variety of sectors helping its promotion; in short, very similar phenomena to Japan.
It is true that there exists the similarity between Japanese and Canadian endeavours. Even they can be reduced into one category, ''middle power diplomacy''. However, one crucial difference can be found on each country's desirable self-image in international society. On the one hand, since 1945, Canada has aimed to situate itself as just a unique state by its unique contribution. On the other hand, what postwar Japan has purported is more than a unique state. Rather, it has been a great power, with unique means, and in this meaning the country has long sought its own way of contribution. Pre-WWII imperial Japan was surely a great power in a military sense, which was totally abandoned after its war defeat. The postwar Japan re-directed its course to ''occupy an honoured place in international society'' through almost unrivalled economy, yet this was finally condemned as insufficient during the Gulf War period. Here, one should recall that it is the psychological factor that gave an initial motivation for creating human security discourse. The diplomatic ''trauma'' of the Gulf War brought Japanese' mental shift from existing pacifism, UN-centrism, and check book diplomacy, but it also put people into a deep dilemma between the will to be a responsive state in international society: a ''normal nation'' (Ozawa, 1993) , with a formal rearmament under revised Constitution, or the original position of pacifism with holding the Article 9 still.
Having stated, what was chosen was via media. In Japanese context, human security is constructed as neither military-centered nor money-centered policy. It does not express the prominence of military means, while it goes beyond mere economic development. And it is precisely at this point that Japan has found a proper direction for conducting the country in international society: what had been required to the country were both keeping the Article 9 as well as showing the flag by more than giving money.
In this context, pursuing such ''third way'' requires neither military measures nor financial, thus Japan's option was intellectual: providing a knowledge base. Importantly, human security is primarily a discourse. It is a norm, an ideational stuff or knowledge after all. It is constructed by intellectuals and policymakers, which the norm also constructs the meaning of security, sovereignty and the social world simultaneously. In its core, there exists an idea of freedom, capability, and dignity of human being, all of which may belong to humanitarianism. Making practical knowledge by linking humanitarianism became a perfect option for the country which aims to be both ''unique and great''. Indeed, Japan's purpose to ''occupy an honored place'' is a different kind of great power from the one once argued by Hedley Bull (1977 Bull ( /1995 . Greater honor requires greater responsibility. But for Japan, taking greater responsibility as ''normal'' great powers has remained a difficult choice. Being ''unique and great'' power is a requirement primarily due to the country's former imperialism. Nevertheless, it also turns an opportunity for Japan to identify the best possible ''honored position'' in international society. It is knowledge that was seen as the key to meet the requirement, and this is around which Japanese academic-policy complex has been working.
Conclusion
The paper's aim is to analyze the relationship between the human security discourse and Japanese academic-policy complex, and now the whole analysis can be summarized as following points. First, there does exist an intimacy between intellectuals and policymakers. Second, more precisely to say, the country's academic-policy complex has used four factors which were given originally at random, psychological, institutional, intellectual, and material. It played vital role to make the country as an ''assembly line'' for constructing the human security discourse. Third, such close relationship is, however, different from a similar experience seen in the United States, as Japanese case has been the multiple participation under government's powerful initiative. While emphasizing on the importance of academicpolicy collaboration, it is much simpler to see the case as a ''catch-up'' model: after all, human security has been a project not only as the development of an international agenda, but also as the national enterprise to make Japan still ''occupy an honourable place in the international society''. Fourth, therefore, Japanese experience is also differentiated from another similar case of Canada, in a sense that Japan's attempt was the one that aims to achieve a status of a ''unique and great'' power in international society through knowledge. Finally, Japanese efforts for promoting and articulating human security through developing a discourse seem to be successful: for the world, there now exist strong policy tools, and for Japan, human security provides a ''unique and great'' position in the international society. They are the process and the consequences of a ''Japanese social science''.
Nevertheless, two questions now newly emerge for further inquiry. The first is whether Japan will engage herself to promote human security in the future. Importantly, human security is, after all, the product of the ''pre 9.11 world''. Thus one may well reasonably ask if human security matters at all, as the world has experienced intensive backrush to national or ''homeland'' security since 9.11. It is important to recall that the original UNDP proposal did mention the combat against terrorism, but such inclusion seems inadequate, because the real response to terrorism has remained as state/military centric. In Japanese context, human security seems to experience a transformation to ''Heiwa Kochiku (Peace-building)'', and even this small instance shows such shift means the one from human to state. The underlying inquiry here is whether human security is requires territorial security in advance, by what means it should be conditioned, 14 and more importantly, if human security can be sacrificed for maintaining state's security and order. Another question is how we can evaluate the intimate relationship between intellectuals and practitioners. From policy perspective, Japan's experience for developing human security discourse may be an example of successful collaboration. Nevertheless, this does not mean that Japanese academic-policy complex is exempt from critical 206 IKEDA scrutiny. Indeed, it is argued that there have been several discourses on the topic (Sato, 2007) , some of which had been contradictory to conventional, mainstream notions. In this context, the process of constructing or ''Japanising'' human security is the one of including some ideas and excluding others, thereafter essentialising the idea of human security under certain direction. In such situation, problematising the nexus between policymakers and intellectuals, as well as the whole process of creating human security discourse, therefore will open up new discussions. Such inquiry may not be the question for policymakers. Yet keeping the healthy plurality among policymakers, academics, and ordinary people, as well as the opportunity for mutual criticism, remains vital. It is vital not primarily for those who concern the issue of human security, but also the people who are actually in need of policy.
Notes
